The University of New Hampshire Law Review
Volume 9
Number 1 University of New Hampshire Law
Review

Article 5

December 2010

42 U.S.C. § 1983: A Legal Vehicle with No International Human
Rights Treaty Passengers
Matthew J. Jowanna
The Law Offices of Matthew J. Jowanna

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/unh_lr
Part of the International Humanitarian Law Commons, and the Transnational Law Commons

Repository Citation
Matthew J. Jowanna, 42 U.S.C. § 1983: A Legal Vehicle with No International Human Rights Treaty
Passengers, 9 U.N.H. L. REV. 31 (2010), available at http://scholars.unh.edu/unh_lr/vol9/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – Franklin Pierce School
of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The University of
New Hampshire Law Review by an authorized editor of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more
information, please contact sue.zago@law.unh.edu.

42 U.S.C. § 1983: A Legal Vehicle with No International
Human Rights Treaty Passengers
MATTHEW J. JOWANNA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 32
II. HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES CONDITIONALLY RATIFIED BY THE
UNITED STATES ......................................................................... 33
III. THE INTERNATIONAL REACTION................................................. 41
IV. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ........................................................................ 56
V. NON-SELF-EXECUTING DECLARATIONS: THERE IS MORE TO IT . 59
VI. RATIFIED TREATIES NOW! RESCISSION OF RUDS LATER? ........ 62
VII.CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 65

Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small
places, close to home—so close and so small that they cannot
be seen on any maps of the world. Yet they are the world of
the individual person: the neighborhood he lives in; the
school or college he attends; the factory, farm, or office
where he works. Such are the places where every man,
woman, and child seeks equal justice, equal opportunity,
equal dignity without discrimination. Unless these rights
have meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere.
- Eleanor Roosevelt1
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I. INTRODUCTION
How do international human rights treaties interact with the domestic civil rights law of the United States and, particularly, 42
U.S.C. § 1983? How should international human rights treaties interact with the domestic civil rights law of the United States? ―International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.‖2 The United States is obligated to respect the international treaties it ratifies, whether they are fully implemented in domestic law or not.3 In practice, however, exactly how has this been
done, or not done, regarding 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and international human rights treaties?
This article begins with an examination of the three most recent
international human rights treaties ratified by the United States of
America: 1) the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights;4 2) the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;5 and 3) the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina2. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
3. See Mary Ellen O‘Connell, Affirming the Ban on Harsh Interrogation, 66
OHIO ST. L.J. 1231, 1235 (2005); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729
(2004) (―For two centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law of the United
States recognizes the law of nations.‖).
4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966,
6 I.L.M. 368, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter CCPR]. The CCPR was signed by the
United States on October 5, 1977, and ratified by the United States on June 8,
1992. Status of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED
NATIONS
TREATY
COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/pages/View
Details.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=1&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=e
n#EndDec (last visited Nov. 7, 2010).
5. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]. The CAT was signed by the United States on
April 18, 1988. Id., S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20. It was ratified by the United
States on October 21, 1994. Status of the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE
&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Nov. 7, 2010).
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tion.6 This article also addresses the conditions upon which the
United States ratified these three conventions. Next, this article addresses the international reaction to the United States‘ position with
regard to the ratification of international human rights treaties. This
article then analyzes the applicability of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as an appropriate legal vehicle for the domestic litigation of international
treaty violations. Next, this article discusses, in more detail, exactly
what it means for a treaty to contain a non-self-executing declaration
and how such a declaration directly affects the attempted use of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to litigate international treaty violations in domestic
courts. Finally, this article sets forth a few theories for why the
United States has not ratified human rights treaties on an allinclusive basis and concludes that, nevertheless, the ratification of
international human rights conventions by the United States is a positive first step. However, it is now time for the United States to take
the next logical step in promoting civil and human rights by withdrawing its reservations, understandings, and declarations to the international human rights conventions it has ratified.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES CONDITIONALLY RATIFIED BY THE
UNITED STATES
The three major human rights treaties, most akin to what many in
the United States may refer to as constitutionally protected civil
rights, that the United States has ratified are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR);7 the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT);8 and the International Convention on the Elimina6. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-18, 660
U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD]. The CERD was signed by the United States on
September 28, 1966. Id., 660 U.N.T.S. at 303. It was ratified by the United States
on October 21, 1994. Status of the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtds
g_no=IV-2&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Nov. 7, 2010).
7. See CCPR, supra note 4.
8. See CAT, supra note 5.
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tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).9 These three
international human rights treaties provide individuals with civil and
political rights, including the right to protection from torture, cruelty,
and discrimination. While certainly not an exhaustive list of all
rights provided, these three international human rights treaties provide individuals with express rights, such as: 1) the right to life; 10 2)
―the right to liberty‖ and ―freedom of movement‖;11 3) the right to
freedom of peaceful assembly and association;12 4) the right to privacy;13 5) ―the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion‖;14 6) the right to freedom of opinion and expression;15 7) the
right to be free from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment;16
8) the right to be secure as an individual and to be free from governmental violence or bodily harm;17 9) the right to make official
complaints of torture;18 10) if a victim of torture, the right to adequate compensation;19 11) the right to preclude the judicial use of
statements and confessions obtained as a result of torture;20 12) the
right to equality before the law and the equal administration of jus9. See CERD, supra note 6.
10. CCPR, supra note 4, 6 I.L.M. at 370, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174, pt. III, art. 6.1.
11. Id., 6 I.L.M. at 372, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176, art. 12.1; CERD, supra note 6, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 95-18 at 4, 660 U.N.T.S. at 220, pt. I, art. 5(d)(i).
12. CCPR, supra note 4, 6 I.L.M. at 374, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178, pt. III, arts. 21–
22; CERD, supra note 6, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-18 at 4, 660 U.N.T.S. at 222, pt.
I, art. 5(d)(ix).
13. CCPR, supra note 4, 6 I.L.M. at 373, 999 U.N.T.S. at 177, pt. III, art. 17.
14. Id., 6 I.L.M. at 374, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178, art. 18.1; CERD, supra note 6, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 95-18 at 4, 660 U.N.T.S. at 222, pt. I, art. 5(d)(vii).
15. CCPR, supra note 4, 6 I.L.M. at 374, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178, pt. III, arts. 19.1–
19.2; CERD, supra note 6, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-18 at 4, 660 U.N.T.S. at 222,
pt. I, art. 5(d)(viii).
16. CAT, supra note 5, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 at 20, 23, 1465 U.N.T.S. at
114, 116, pt. I, arts. 4.1, 16; CCPR, supra note 4, 6 I.L.M. at 370, 999 U.N.T.S. at
175, pt. III, art. 7.
17. CCPR, supra note 4, 6 I.L.M. at 371, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175, pt. III, art. 9.1;
CERD, supra note 6, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-18 at 4, 660 U.N.T.S. at 220, pt. I,
art. 5(b).
18. See CAT, supra note 5, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 at 22, 1465 U.N.T.S. at
116, pt. I, art. 12 (discussing State Party investigation whenever there is ―reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been committed‖).
19. Id., S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 at 22–23, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 116, art. 14.1.
20. Id., S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 at 23, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 116, art. 15.
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tice;21 13) the right to be free from ―arbitrary arrest or detention‖;22
14) the right to be treated equally and without discrimination;23 15)
the right to racially-equal elections and governmental participation;24
and 16) the right to equal pay.25 The United States ratified these
treaties with a number of reservations,26 understandings,27 and declarations28—sometimes referred to as RUDs.
21. CCPR, supra note 4, 6 I.L.M. at 372, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176, pt. III, art. 14.1;
CERD, supra note 6, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-18 at 4, 660 U.N.T.S. at 220, pt. I,
art. 5(a).
22. CCPR, supra note 4, 6 I.L.M. at 371, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175, pt. III, art. 9.1.
23. Id., 6 I.L.M. at 375, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179, art. 26; CERD, supra note 6, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 95-18 at 4, 660 U.N.T.S. at 216, pt. I, art. 2.1.
24. CCPR, supra note 4, 6 I.L.M. at 375, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179, pt. III, art. 25;
CERD, supra note 6, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-18 at 4, 660 U.N.T.S. at 220, pt. I,
art. 5(c).
25. CERD, supra note 6, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-18 at 4, 660 U.N.T.S. at 222,
pt. I, art. 5(e)(i).
26. U.N. Secretary-General, Status of the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Reservations, Declarations and Objections Under the Convention, at 19–20, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/2/Rev.5 (Jan. 22, 1998) [hereinafter CAT RUDs]; U.N. Secretary-General,
Declarations, Reservations, Withdrawals of Reservations, Objections to Reservations and Declarations Relating to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, at 28, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/60/Rev.4
(May 16, 2001) [hereinafter CERD RUDs]; U.N. Secretary-General, Reservations,
Declarations, Notifications and Objections Relating to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocols Thereto, at 40–41, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/2/Rev.4 (Aug. 24, 1994) [hereinafter CCPR RUDs]. The following
are the CAT Reservations:
1. That the United States considers itself bound by the obligation
under article 16 to prevent ―cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment‖, only in so far as the term ―cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment‖ means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or
punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
2. That pursuant to article 30 (2) the United States declares that it
does not consider itself bound by Article 30 (1), but reserves the right
specifically to agree to follow this or any other procedure for arbitration
in a particular case.
CAT RUDs, supra, at 19–20. The following are the CERD Reservations:
(1) That the Constitution and laws of the United States contain extensive protections of individual freedom of speech, expression and association. Accordingly, the United States does not accept any obligation
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under this Convention, in particular under articles 4 and 7, to restrict
those rights, through the adoption of legislation or any other measures, to
the extent that they are protected by the Constitution and laws of the
United States.
(2) That the Constitution and laws of the United States establish extensive protections against discrimination, reaching significant areas of
non-governmental activity. Individual privacy and freedom from governmental interference in private conduct, however, are also recognized
as among the fundamental values which shape our free and democratic
society. The United States understands that the identification of the rights
protected under the Convention by reference in article 1 to fields of ―public life‖ reflects a similar distinction between spheres of public conduct
that are customarily the subject of governmental regulation, and spheres
of private conduct that are not. To the extent, however, that the Convention calls for a broader regulation of private conduct, the United States
does not accept any obligation under this Convention to enact legislation
or take other measures under paragraph (1) of article 2, subparagraphs (1)
(c) and (d) of article 2, article 3 and article 5 with respect to private conduct except as mandated by the Constitution and laws of the United
States.
(3) That with reference to article 22 of the Convention, before any
dispute to which the United States is a party may be submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under this article, the specific consent of the United States is required in each case.
CERD RUDs, supra, at 28. The following are the CCPR Reservations:
(1) That article 20 does not authorize or require legislation or other
action by the United States that would restrict the right of free speech and
association protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
(2) That the United States reserves the right, subject to its constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person (other than
a pregnant woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment, including such punishment for
crimes committed by persons below 18 years of age.
(3) That the United States considers itself bound by article 7 to the
extent that ‗cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment‘ means
the cruel and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the fifth,
eighth, and/or fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United
States.
(4) That because United States law generally applies to an offender
the penalty in force at the time the offence was committed, the United
States does not adhere to the third clause of paragraph 1 of article 15.
(5) That the policy and practice of the United States are generally in
compliance with and supportive of the Covenant‘s provisions regarding
treatment of juveniles in the criminal justice system. Nevertheless, the
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United States reserves the right, in exceptional circumstances, to treat juveniles as adults, notwithstanding paragraphs 2 (b) and 3 of article 10 and
paragraph 4 of article 14. The United States further reserves to these provisions with respect to States with respect to individuals who volunteer
for military service prior to age 18.
CCPR RUDs, supra, at 40–41.
27. See CAT RUDs, supra note 26, at 20–21; CERD RUDSs, supra note 26, at
28–29; CCPR RUDs, supra note 26, at 41–42. The following are the CAT understandings:
1. (a) That with reference to article 1, the United States understands
that, in order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended to
inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering and that mental pain or
suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from:
(1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical
pain or suffering; (2) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (3)
the threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat that another person will
imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the
administration or application of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality;
(b) That the United States understands that the definition of torture
in article 1 is intended to apply only to acts directed against persons in the
offender‘s custody or physical control;
(c) That with reference to article 1 of the Convention, the United
States understands that ―sanctions‖ includes judicially-imposed sanctions
and other enforcement actions authorized by United States law or by
judicial interpretation of such law. None the less, the United States understands that a State party could not through its domestic sanctions defeat the object and purpose of the Convention to prohibit torture;
(d) That with reference to article 1 of the Convention, the United
States understands that the term ―acquiescence‖ requires that the public
official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such
activity and thereafter breach his legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity;
(e) That with reference to article 1 of the Convention, the United
States understands that non-compliance with applicable legal procedural
standards does not per se constitute torture;
2. That the United States understands the phrase, ―where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture‖, as used in article 3 of the Convention, to mean ―if it is
more likely than not that he would be tortured‖.
3. That it is the understanding of the United States that article 14 requires a State party to provide a private right of action for damages only
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for acts of torture committed in territory under the jurisdiction of that
State party;
4. That the United States understands that international law does not
prohibit the death penalty, and does not consider this Convention to restrict or prohibit the United States from applying the death penalty consistent with the Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, including any constitutional period of confinement prior to the imposition of the death penalty;
5. That the United States understands that this Convention shall be
implemented by the United States Government to the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered by the
Convention and otherwise by the State and local governments. Accordingly, in implementing articles 10–14 and 16, the United States Government shall take measures appropriate to the Federal system to the end
that the competent authorities of the constituent units of the United States
of America may take appropriate measures for the fulfillment of the Convention.
CAT RUDs, supra note 26, at 20–21. The following are the CERD understandings:
That the United States understands that this Convention shall be implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and
local governments to the extent that state and local governments exercise
jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal Government shall, as necessary, take appropriate measures to ensure the fulfillment of this Convention.
CERD RUDSs, supra note 26, at 29.
The Constitution of the United States contains provisions for the protection of individual rights, such as the right of free speech, and nothing
in the Convention shall be deemed to require or to authorize legislation or
other action by the United States of America incompatible with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States of America.
Id. at 28. The following are the CCPR understandings:
(1) That the Constitution and laws of the United States guarantee all
persons equal protection of the law and provide extensive protections
against discrimination. The United States understands distinctions based
upon race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or any other status - as those terms
are used in article 2, paragraph 1 and article 26 - to be permitted when
such distinctions are, at minimum, rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective. The United States further understands the prohibition in paragraph 1 of article 4 upon discrimination, in time of public
emergency, based ‗solely‘ on the status of race, colour, sex, language, re-
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ligion or social origin, not to bar distinctions that may have a disproportionate effect upon persons of a particular status.
(2) That the United States understands the right to compensation referred to in articles 9 (5) and 14 (6) to require the provision of effective
and enforceable mechanisms by which a victim of an unlawful arrest or
detention or a miscarriage of justice may seek and, where justified, obtain
compensation from either the responsible individual or the appropriate
governmental entity. Entitlement to compensation may be subject to the
reasonable requirements of domestic law.
(3) That the United States understands the reference to ‗exceptional
circumstances‘ in paragraph 2 (a) of article 10 to permit the imprisonment
of an accused person with convicted persons where appropriate in light of
an individual‘s overall dangerousness, and to permit accused persons to
waive their right to segregation from convicted persons. The United
States further understands that paragraph 3 of article 10 does not diminish
the goals of punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation as additional legitimate purposes for a penitentiary system.
(4) That the United States understands that subparagraphs 3 (b) and
(d) of article 14 do not require the provision of a criminal defendant‘s
counsel of choice when the defendant is provided with court-appointed
counsel on grounds of indigence, when the defendant is financially able
to retain alternative counsel, or when imprisonment is not imposed. The
United States further understands that paragraph 3 (e) does not prohibit a
requirement that the defendant make a showing that any witness whose
attendance he seeks to compel is necessary for his defence. The United
States understands the prohibition upon double jeopardy in paragraph 7 to
apply only when the judgment of acquittal has been rendered by a court
of the same governmental unit, whether the Federal Government or a
constituent unit, as is seeking a new trial for the same cause.
(5) That the United States understands that this Covenant shall be
implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises
legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and
otherwise by the State and local Governments; to the extent that State and
local Governments exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal
Government shall take measures appropriate to the Federal system to the
end that the competent authorities of the State or local Governments may
take appropriate measures for the fulfillment of the Covenant.
CCPR RUDs, supra note 26, at 41–42.
28. The following are the CAT declarations made by the United States: ―That the
United States declares that the provisions of articles 1 through 16 of the Convention are not self-executing.‖ CAT RUDs, supra note 26, at 21. ―The Government
of the United States of America reserves the right to communicate, upon ratification, such reservations, interpretive understandings, or declarations as are deemed
necessary.‖ Id. at 19. The following is the CERD declaration made by the United
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While the United States referenced its own Constitution in understanding the rights it ratified in these treaties,29 it nevertheless
made a point to declare that the rights contained within the ratified
treaties are not self-executing.30 The circular reasoning of adopting
international human rights treaties with the basic understanding that
the United States already complies with the treaties by and through
its pre-existing national law, while at the same time reducing the
United States‘ treaty obligations to non-justiciable issues in national
courts, is the primary focus of this article. In this regard, the effect
of such non-self-executing declarations31 will be explained in more
States: ―That the United States declares that the provisions of the Convention are
not self-executing.‖ CERD RUDs, supra note 26, at 29. The following are the
CCPR declarations:
(1) That the United States declares that the provisions of articles 1
through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing.
(2) That it is the view of the United States that States Party to the
Covenant should wherever possible refrain from imposing any restrictions or limitations on the exercise of the rights recognized and protected
by the Covenant, even when such restrictions and limitations are permissible under the terms of the Covenant. For the United States, article 5, paragraph 2, which provides that fundamental human rights existing in any
State Party may not be diminished on the pretext that the Covenant recognizes them to a lesser extent, has particular relevance to article 19, paragraph 3 which would permit certain restrictions on the freedom of expression. The United States declares that it will continue to adhere to the
requirements and constraints of its Constitution in respect to all such restrictions and limitations.
(3) That the United States declares that the right referred to in article
47 may be exercised only in accordance with international law.
CCPR RUDs, supra note 26, at 42.
29. See CAT RUDs, supra note 26, at 20–21; CERD RUDs, supra note 26, at 28;
CCPR RUDs, supra note 26, at 41–42.
30. See CAT RUDs, supra note 26, at 21; CERD RUDs, supra note 26, at 29;
CCPR RUDs, supra note 26, at 42.
31. See generally Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 58th sess, Mar. 6–23, 2001, 59th sess, July 30–Aug. 17, 2001, ¶¶ 390–91,
U.N. Doc. A/56/18; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 18 (2001) [hereinafter CERD
Report 2001]; Comm. Against Torture, Summary Record of the First Part (Public)* of the 427th Meeting, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.427 (May 11, 2000) [hereinafter Sum. Record 427th Mtng.]; Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1995, ¶¶ 56, 60, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/Add.5 (Oct.
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detail as this article progresses. However, if the United States truly
already complies with human rights treaty norms domestically, then
why did it agree to international responsibility by ratifying the conventions? Conversely, if ratifying these conventions instituted at
least one new human rights obligation, then why not provide judicially enforceable rights? How did the international community
react to the reservations, understandings, and declarations made by
the United States? These questions are answered below.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL REACTION
The reservations, understandings, and declarations the United
States made concerning the CCPR did not go unnoticed by the international community. Belgium,32 Denmark,33 Finland,34 France,35

15, 1999) [hereinafter Consideration of Art. 19 Reports, Addendum]; Comm. on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ¶¶ 11, 18, U.N. Doc.
CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (Feb. 18–Mar. 7, 2008) [hereinafter Consideration of Art. 9
Reports]; Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Reports Submitted
by States Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention: Third Periodic Reports of
States Parties Due in 1999, ¶¶ 169–73, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/351/Add.1 (Sept. 21,
2000) [hereinafter Art. 9 Reports, Addendum]; Human Rights Comm., Summary
Record of the 1405th Meeting, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1405 (Mar. 31, 1995)
[hereinafter Sum. Record 1405th Mtng.]; Human Rights Comm., Summary Record
of the 1402d Meeting, ¶¶ 3, 25, 37, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1402d (Mar. 29, 1995)
[hereinafter Sum. Record 1402d Mtng.]; Human Rights Comm., Summary Record
of the 1401st Meeting, ¶¶ 12, 34, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1401 (Mar. 29, 1995)
[hereinafter Sum. Record 1401st Mtng.]; Human Rights Comm., Consideration of
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1993, ¶¶ 8, 129, annex III (I), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/81/Add.4 (July 29, 1994) [hereinafter Consideration of Art. 40 Reports,
Addendum]; see also infra Part IV.
32. Belgium stated that:
The Government of Belgium wishes to raise an objection to the reservation made by the United States of America regarding article 6, paragraph 5, of the Covenant, which prohibits the imposition of the sentence
of death for crimes committed by persons below 18 years of age.
The Government of Belgium considers the reservation to be incompatible with the provisions and intent of article 6 of the Covenant which,
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as is made clear by article 4, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, establishes
minimum measures to protect the right to life.
The expression of this objection does not constitute an obstacle to the
entry into force of the Covenant between Belgium and the United States
of America.
CCPR RUDs, supra note 26, at 48.
33. Denmark stated that:
[H]aving examined the contents of the reservations made by the
United States of America, Denmark would like to recall article 4, paragraph 2, of the Covenant according to which no derogation from a number of fundamental articles, inter alia 6 and 7, may be made by a State
Party even in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation.
In the opinion of Denmark, reservation (2) of the United States with
respect to capital punishment for crimes committed by persons below 18
years of age, as well as reservation (3) with respect to article 7, constitute
general derogations from articles 6 and 7, while according to article 4, paragraph 2, of the Covenant such derogations are not permitted.
Therefore, and taking into account that articles 6 and 7 are protecting
two of the most basic rights contained in the Covenant, the Government
of Denmark regards the said reservations incompatible with the object
and purpose of the Covenant, and consequently Denmark objects to the
reservations.
These objections do not constitute an obstacle to the entry into force
of the Covenant between Denmark and the United States.
Id. at 49.
34. Finland stated that:
It is recalled that under international treaty law, the name assigned to a
statement whereby the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty is excluded or modified, does not determine its status as a reservation to the
treaty. Understanding (1) pertaining to articles 2, 4 and 26 of the Covenant is therefore considered to constitute in substance a reservation to the
Covenant, directed at some of its most essential provisions, namely those
concerning the prohibition of discrimination. In the view of the Government of Finland, a reservation of this kind is contrary to the object and
purpose of the Covenant, as specified in article 19 (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
As regards reservation (2) concerning article 6 of the Covenant, it is
recalled that according to article 4 (2), no restrictions of articles 6 and 7
of the Covenant are allowed for. In the view of the Government of Finland, the right to life is of fundamental importance in the Covenant and
the said reservation therefore is incompatible with the object and purpose
of the Covenant.
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Germany,36 Italy,37 the Netherlands,38 Norway,39 Portugal,40 Spain,41
and Sweden42 all commented or objected to the conditioned ratifica-

As regards reservation (3), it is in the view of the Government of
Finland subject to the general principle of treaty interpretation according
to which a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for failure to perform a treaty.
For the above reasons the Government of Finland objects to reservations made by the United States to articles 2, 4 and 26 (cf. Understanding
(1)), to article 6 (cf. Reservation (2)) and to article 7 (cf. Reservation (3)).
However, the Government of Finland does not consider that this objection constitutes an obstacle to the entry into force of the Covenant between Finland and the United States of America.
Id. at 49–50.
35. France stated that:
At the time of the ratification of the [CCPR], the United States of
America expressed a reservation relating to article 6, paragraph 5, of the
Covenant, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for crimes
committed by persons below 18 years of age.
France considers that this United States reservation is not valid, inasmuch as it is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.
Such objection does not constitute an obstacle to the entry into force
of the Covenant between France and the United States.
Id. at 50.
36. Germany stated that:
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany objects to the
United States‘ reservation referring to article 6, paragraph 5 of the Covenant, which prohibits capital punishment for crimes committed by persons below 18 years of age. The reservation referring to this provision is
incompatible with the text as well as the object and purpose of article 6,
which, as made clear by paragraph 2 of article 4, lays down the minimum
standard for the protection of the right to life.
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany interprets the
United States‘ reservation with regard to article 7 of the Covenant as a
reference to article 2 of the Covenant, thus not in any way affecting the
obligations of the United States of America as a state party to the Covenant.
Id. at 51–52.
37. Italy stated that:
The Government of Italy objects to the reservation to article 6, paragraph 5, which the United States of America included in its instrument of
ratification.
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In the opinion of Italy reservations to the provisions contained in article 6 are not permitted, as specified in article 4, paragraph 2, of the Covenant.
Therefore this reservation is null and void since it is incompatible
with the object and the purpose of article 6 of the Covenant.
Furthermore in the interpretation of the Government of Italy, the reservation to article 7 of the Covenant does not affect obligations assumed
by States that are parties to the Covenant on the basis of article 2 of the
same Covenant.
These objections do not constitute an obstacle to the entry into force
of the Covenant between Italy and the United States.
Id. at 52.
38. The Netherlands stated:
The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands objects to the
reservation with respect to capital punishment for crimes committed by
persons below 18 years of age, since it follows from the text and history
of the Covenant that the said reservation is incompatible with the text, the
object and purpose of article 6 of the Covenant, which according to article 4 lays down the minimum standard for the protection of the right to
life.
The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands objects to the
reservation with respect to article 7 of the Covenant, since it follows from
the text and the interpretation of this article that the said reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant.
In the opinion of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
this reservation has the same effect as a general derogation from this article, while according to article 4 of the Covenant, no derogations, not
even in times of public emergency, are permitted.
It is the understanding of the Government of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands that the understandings and declarations of the United States
do not exclude or modify the legal effect of provisions of the Covenant in
their application to the United States, and do not in any way limit the
competence of the Human Rights Committee to interpret these provisions
in their application to the United States.
Subject to the proviso of article 21, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, these objections do not constitute an obstacle to the entry into force of the Covenant between the Kingdom of the
Netherlands and the United States.
CCPR RUDs, supra note 26, at 54.
39. Norway stated that:
1. In the view of the Government of Norway, the reservation (2)
concerning capital punishment for crimes committed by persons below
eighteen years of age is according to the text and history of the Covenant,
incompatible with the object and purpose of article 6 of the Covenant.
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According to article 4, paragraph 2, no derogations from article 6 may be
made, not even in times of public emergency. For these reasons the Government of Norway objects to this reservation.
2. In the view of the Government of Norway, the reservation (3)
concerning article 7 of the Covenant is according to the text and interpretation of this article incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant. According to article 4, paragraph 2, article 7 is a non-derogable
provision, even in times of public emergency. For these reasons, the
Government of Norway objects to this reservation.
The Government of Norway does not consider this objection to constitute an obstacle to the entry into force of the Covenant between Norway and the United States of America.
Id. at 54–55.
40. Portugal stated that:
The Government of Portugal considers that the reservation made by
the United States of America referring to article 6, paragraph 5 of the Covenant which prohibits capital punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age is incompatible with article 6 which, as
made clear by paragraph 2 of article 4, lays down the minimum standard
for the protection of the right to life.
The Government of Portugal also considers that the reservation with
regard to article 7 in which a State limits its responsibilities under the
Covenant by invoking general principles of National Law may create
doubts on the commitments of the Reserving State to the object and purpose of the Covenant and, moreover, contribute to undermining the basis
of International Law.
The Government of Portugal therefore objects to the reservations
made by the United States of America. These objections shall not constitute an obstacle to the entry into force of the Covenant between Portugal
and the United States of America.
Id. at 55–56.
41. Spain stated that:
[A]fter careful consideration of the reservations made by the United
States of America, Spain wishes to point out that pursuant to article 4, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, a State Party may not derogate from several
basic articles, among them articles 6 and 7, including in time of public
emergency which threatens the life of the nation.
The Government of Spain takes the view that reservation (2) of the
United States having regard to capital punishment for crimes committed
by individuals under 18 years of age, in addition to reservation (3) having
regard to article 7, constitute general derogations from articles 6 and 7,
whereas, according to article 4, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, such derogations are not to be permitted.
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tion of the CCPR by the United States. Likewise, the reservations,
understandings, and declarations the United States made concerning
the CAT did not go unnoticed by the international community either.
Finland,43 Germany,44 the Netherlands,45 and Sweden46 all comTherefore, and bearing in mind that articles 6 and 7 protect two of
the most fundamental rights embodied in the Covenant, the Government
of Spain considers that these reservations are incompatible with the object
and purpose of the Covenant and, consequently, objects to them.
This position does not constitute an obstacle to the entry into force of
the Covenant between the Kingdom of Spain and the United States of
America.
Id. at 56.
42. Sweden stated that:
In this context the Government recalls that under international treaty law,
the name assigned to a statement whereby the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty is excluded or modified, does not determine its status
as a reservation to the treaty. Thus, the Government considers that some
of the understandings made by the United States in substance constitute
reservations to the Covenant.
A reservation by which a State modifies or excludes the application
of the most fundamental provisions of the Covenant, or limits its responsibilities under that treaty by invoking general principles of national law,
may cast doubts upon the commitment of the reserving State to the object
and purpose of the Covenant. The reservations made by the United States
of America include both reservations to essential and non-derogable provisions, and general references to national legislation. Reservations of
this nature contribute to undermining the basis of international treaty law.
All States parties share a common interest in the respect for the object
and purpose of the treaty to which they have chosen to become parties.
Sweden therefore objects to the reservations made by the United
States to:
- article 2; cf. Understanding (1)
- article 4; cf. Understanding (1)
- article 6; cf. Reservation (2)
- article 7; cf. Reservation (3)
- article 15; cf. Reservation (4)
- article 26; cf. Understanding (1)
This objection does not constitute an obstacle to the entry into force of
the Covenant between Sweden and the United States of America.
Id. at 56–57.
43. Finland stated that:
A reservation which consists of a general reference to national law
without specifying its contents does not clearly define to the other Parties
of the Convention the extent to which the reserving State commits itself
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to the Convention and therefore may cast doubts about the commitment
of the reserving State to fulfill its obligations under the Convention. Such
a reservation is also, in the view of the Government of Finland, subject to
the general principle to treaty interpretation according to which a party
may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for failure to perform a treaty.
The Government of Finland therefore objects to the reservation made
by the United States to article 16 of the Convention (cf. Reservation I.
(1)). In this connection the Government of Finland would also like to refer to its objection to the reservation entered by the United States with regard to article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.
CAT RUDs, supra note 26, at 26–27.
44. Germany articulated that with respect ―to the reservation under I (1) and the
understanding under II (2) and (3)‖ made by the United States of America upon
ratification, ―[i]t is the understanding of the Government of the Federal Republic
of Germany that [the said reservations and understandings] do not touch upon the
obligations of the United States of America as State Party to the Convention.‖ Id.
at 27.
45. The Netherlands stated that:
The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands considers the
reservation made by the United States of America regarding article 16 of
the Convention to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the
Convention, to which the obligation laid down in article 16 is essential.
Moreover, it is not clear how the provisions of the Constitution of the
United States of America relate to the obligations under the Convention.
The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands therefore objects to
the said reservation. This objection shall not preclude the entry into force
of the Convention between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of America.
The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands considers the
following understandings to have no impact on the obligations of the
United States of America under the Convention:
II. 1a This understanding appears to restrict the scope of the definition of torture under article 1 of the Convention.
1d This understanding diminishes the continuous responsibility of public officials for behaviour of their subordinates.
The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands reserves its
position with regard to the understandings II. 1b, 1c, and 2 as the contents thereof are insufficiently clear.
Id. at 28–29.
46. Sweden stated that:
[T]he Government of Sweden would like to refer to its objections to the
reservations entered by the United States of America with regard to ar-
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mented or objected to the conditioned ratification of the CAT by the
United States. However, unlike the CCPR and the CAT, the international community was, at least initially, relatively silent regarding
the reservations, understandings, and declarations the United States
made concerning its conditioned ratification of the CERD.47 However, as will be discussed below, this silence did not last throughout
the interaction between the United States and the respective treaty
committees.
In their objections, Finland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden appear to have hit the nail squarely on the head.48 Specifically,
concerning the CCPR, Finland‘s objection correctly set forth that ―a
party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for failure to perform a treaty.‖49 Portugal‘s objection set forth:
[T]he reservation . . . in which a State limits its responsibilities under the Covenant by invoking general principles of
National Law may create doubts on the commitments of the
Reserving State to the object and purpose of the Covenant
and, moreover, contribute to undermining the basis of International Law.50
Sweden, in its objection to the United States‘ conditioned ratification of the CCPR, clearly set forth that it was completely unsatisfactory for the United States to take the position that it can comply
with a treaty by and through its already existing national laws.51
Specifically, Sweden set forth:
ticle 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The
same reasons for objection apply to the now entered reservation with regard to article 16 reservation I (1) of the Convention. The Government of
Sweden therefore objects to that reservation.
It is the view of the Government of Sweden that the understandings
expressed by the United States of America do not relieve the United
States of America as a party to the Convention from the responsibility to
fulfill the obligations undertaken therein.
Id. at 30–31.
47. See CERD RUDs, supra note 26, at 28–29, 34–44.
48. See infra notes 49–54 and accompanying text.
49. CCPR RUDs, supra note 26, at 49.
50. Id. at 55.
51. Id. at 57.
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A reservation by which a State modifies or excludes the
application of the most fundamental provisions of the Covenant, or limits its responsibilities under that treaty by invoking general principles of national law, may cast doubts upon
the commitment of the reserving State to the object and purpose of the Covenant. The reservations made by the United
States of America include both reservations to essential and
non-derogable provisions, and general references to national
legislation. Reservations of this nature contribute to undermining the basis of international treaty law. All States parties share a common interest in the respect for the object and
purpose of the treaty to which they have chosen to become
parties.52
In regard to the CAT, the Netherlands, through its objection to
the reservations, understandings, and declarations of the United
States, set forth that ―it is not clear how the provisions of the Constitution of the United States of America relate to the obligations under
the Convention. The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands therefore objects to the said reservation.‖53 Sweden, through
the same method, referred to its previous objections to the reservations, understandings, and declarations entered by the United States
concerning the CCPR; and then, concerning the reservations, understandings, and declarations of the United States regarding the CAT,
asserted an objection based on the same reasoning.54 Likewise,
while referring to its previous objection regarding the United States
and the CCPR, Finland set forth the following concerning the CAT:
A reservation which consists of a general reference to national law without specifying its contents does not clearly define to the other Parties of the Convention the extent to which
the reserving State commits itself to the Convention and
therefore may cast doubts about the commitment of the reserving State to fulfill its obligations under the Convention.
Such a reservation is also . . . subject to the general principle
of treaty interpretation according to which a party may not
52. Id.
53. CAT RUDs, supra note 26, at 28–29.
54. See id. at 30–31.
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invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for
failure to perform a treaty.55
Finland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden appear to be uniform in their opposition to the understandings of the United States
that attempt to limit its international human rights responsibilities
and obligations to the scope and provisions of the Constitution of the
United States and other domestic law.56 These countries raise a very
valid point. The reservations, understandings, and declarations made
by the United States in ratifying the CCPR, CAT, and CERD may
substantially frustrate the true intent and purpose of the treaties. The
United States, by conditioning the human rights elicited from the
CCPR, CAT, and CERD to the confines of existing domestic law,57
deprives the international community of the commitment of the
United States to the full scope of the rights these treaties purport to
provide. Moreover, by not making the treaty obligations selfexecuting,58 as more fully discussed below, the United States also
denies its own citizens any new enforceable human rights that may
not otherwise be domestically codified. While it is arguably true that
the purpose and intent of a treaty cannot be fully obtained when reservations are asserted, the narrowing of obligations by declaration is
a particularly salient point when the treaty obligations involve human rights that become illusory and unattainable when those rights
cannot be judicially enforced.
Besides the initial reaction of other states to the conditioned ratification of the CCPR, CAT, and CERD, of particular interest is the
reporting requirement, found in the CCPR,59 CAT,60 and CERD.61
To satisfy this requirement, all participating members must report to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for consideration by a
55. Id. at 26–27.
56. See supra notes 34, 38, 40, 42, 43, 45, 46 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
58. See id.
59. See CCPR, supra note 4, 6 I.L.M. at 378, 999 U.N.T.S. at 181, pt. IV, art.
40.1–40.2.
60. See CAT, supra note 5, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 at 24–25, 1465
U.N.T.S. at 117–18, pt. II, art. 19.1.
61. See CERD, supra note 6, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-18 at 6, 660 U.N.T.S. at
224, 226, pt. II, art. 9.1.
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committee, regarding exactly what the reporting members have done
legislatively, judicially, and administratively to give effect to the
provisions in each ratified convention. Making suggestions and recommendations, along with comments from other members, each respective committee then reports to the General Assembly of the
United Nations through the Secretary-General.62
As part of this treaty-reporting process, the United States continues to make itself clear that in ratifying international human rights
treaties, it does not intend to create any enforceable causes of action
to allow for litigation in domestic courts.63 The United States has
purposefully done this due to a mandate by the Executive Branch
and the Senate.64 However, despite this fact, the United States is of
the position that ratifying a treaty that cannot be domestically enforced by its own citizens does not affect the international treaty obligations of the United States.65 It continues to be the position of the
United States that, by and through the enforcement of its already
existing laws, it already does everything required of it by the international human rights treaties it has ratified.66 As an illustrative exam62. CAT, supra note 5, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 at 24–25, 1465 U.N.T.S. at
117–18, pt. II, art. 19; CCPR, supra note 4, 6 I.L.M. at 378, 999 U.N.T.S. at 181,
pt. IV, art. 40; CERD, supra note 6, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-18 at 6, 660 U.N.T.S.
at 224, 226, pt. II, art. 9.
63. See Sum. Record 427th Mtng., supra note 31, ¶ 8; Consideration of Art. 19
Reports, Addendum, supra note 31, ¶ 56; Art. 9 Reports, Addendum, supra note
31, ¶¶ 169–72; Sum. Record 1405th Mtng., supra note 31, ¶ 7; Sum. Record
1401st Mtng., supra note 31, ¶ 12; Consideration of Art. 40 Reports, Addendum,
supra note 31, ¶¶ 8, 129, III (I).
64. Art. 9 Reports, Addendum, supra note 31, ¶ 170; Sum. Record 1405th Mtng.,
supra note 31, ¶ 8; Sum. Record 1401st Mtng., supra note 31, ¶ 12.
65. See Sum. Record 427th Mtng., supra note 31, ¶ 8; Consideration of Art. 19
Reports, Addendum, supra note 31, ¶¶ 57–60; Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Summary Record of the 1475th Meeting, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc.
CERD/C/SR.1475 (Aug. 6, 2001) [hereinafter Sum. Record 1475th Mtng.]; Art. 9
Reports, Addendum, supra note 31, ¶¶ 170–73; Sum. Record 1405th Mtng., supra
note 31, ¶¶ 7–8; Sum. Record 1401st Mtng., supra note 31, ¶¶ 38, 46; Consideration of Art. 40 Reports, Addendum, supra note 31, ¶ 8.
66. See Consideration of Art. 19 Reports, Addendum, supra note 31, ¶ 60; Consideration of Art. 9 Reports, supra note 31, ¶¶ 11, 18; Art. 9 Reports, Addendum,
supra note 31, ¶ 171; Sum. Record 1402d Mtng., supra note 31, ¶¶ 22, 25; Sum.
Record 1401st Mtng., supra note 31, ¶ 34; Consideration of Art. 40 Reports, Addendum, supra note 31, ¶ 8.
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ple, in an addendum to its initial report to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in relation to the CERD, the
United States set forth:
This [non-self-executing] declaration has no effect on the
international obligations of the United States or on its relations with States parties. However, it does have the effect of
precluding the assertion of rights by private parties based on
the Convention in litigation in U.S. courts. In considering ratification of previous human rights treaties, in particular the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1994) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1992), both the
Executive Branch and the Senate have considered it prudent
to declare that those treaties do not create new or independently enforceable private rights in U.S. courts. However,
this declaration does not affect the authority of the Federal
Government to enforce the obligations that the United States
has assumed under the Convention through administrative or
judicial action.67
....
The United States is aware of the Committee‘s preference
for the direct inclusion of the Convention into the domestic
law of States parties. Some non-governmental advocacy
groups in the United States would also prefer that human
rights treaties be made ―self-executing‖ in order to serve as
vehicles for litigation.68
....
As was the case with prior human rights treaties, existing
U.S. law provides protections and remedies sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the present Convention. Moreover,
federal, state, and local laws already provide a comprehensive basis for challenging discriminatory statutes, regulations
and other governmental actions in court, as well as certain
67. Art. 9 Reports, Addendum, supra note 31, ¶ 170.
68. Id. ¶ 173.
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forms of discriminatory conduct by private actors. Given the
adequacy of the provisions already present in U.S. law, there
was no discernible need for the establishment of additional
causes of action or new avenues of litigation in order to guarantee compliance with the essential obligations assumed by
the United States under the Convention.69
. . . Declaring the Convention to be non-self-executing in
no way lessens the obligation of the United States to comply
with its provisions as a matter of international law. Neither
does it contravene any provision of the treaty or restrict the
enjoyment of any right guaranteed by U.S. obligations under
the Convention.70
However, if this is true, then why is it ―prudent‖ to exclude international human rights treaties from domestic enforcement? Perhaps,
the non-self-executing declarations of the United States are also a
―safety valve‖ for the legislative and executive branches of government to prevent the domestic judiciary from gaining disproportional
power over the legislature or from encroaching on the executive role
of international policymaking. As more fully explained below, the
answer may be that the United States is only willing to ratify international human rights treaties if a ―safety valve‖ is included that prevents domestic litigation over treaty rights not codified in national
law.71
The respective treaty committees appear to agree with the questions and points raised herein, and do not agree with the position of
the United States on these issues.72 The respective treaty committees
69. Id. ¶ 171.
70. Id. ¶ 172.
71. For a further discussion of the ―safety valve‖ theory, see Part VI.
72. See Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Conclusions and Recommendations of
the Committee Against Torture, ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (May 1–19,
2006) [hereinafter Consideration of Art. 19 Reports]; Comm. Against Torture,
Summary Record of 703d Mtng., ¶ 72, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.703 (May 5, 2006)
[hereinafter Sum. Record 703d Mtng.]; Art. 9 Reports, Addendum, supra note 31,
¶ 173; Sum. Record 1405th Mtng., supra note 31, ¶ 7; Comm. Against Torture,
List of Issues to be Considered During the Examination of the Second Periodic
Report of the United States of America, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/Q/2 (Nov. 7–
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would prefer that the United States implement the ratified human
rights treaties by direct inclusion of the conventions into domestic
law.73 In fact, the respective committees have taken the position that
the stance of the United States on these issues actually contradicts
the principle that international treaties should take precedence over
domestic law.74 As an exemplar of this sentiment, in 1995, Julio
Prado Vallejo, an Ecuadorian national and a member of the Human
Rights Committee, in response to a CCPR report submitted by the
United States, noted the following:
The United States Government did not seem to have a
high degree of commitment to changing domestic legislation
if it conflicted with the provisions of the Covenant, although
its article 2, paragraph 2, spelled out that obligation clearly.
Moreover, some of the reservations could indeed affect the
object and purpose of the Covenant. . . . The greatest cause
for concern was the declaration that articles 1 to 27 of the
Covenant were not self-executing and could only be applied
if domestic laws already existed.75
Furthermore, it has been relayed to the United States that it
should rescind its non-self-executing declarations in order to demonstrate full support of the conventions.76 As another literal example,
25, 2005) [hereinafter Issues Considered on U.S. 2d Report]; Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Summary Record of the 1474th Meeting, ¶ 30,
U.N. Doc. CERD/C/SR.1474 (Aug. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Sum. Record 1474th
Mtng.]; Sum. Record 1401st Mtng., supra note 31, ¶¶ 34, 46; see also Margaret
Thomas, “Rogue States” Within American Borders: Remedying State Noncompliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 90 CALIF. L.
REV. 165, 177 (2002); Connie de la Vega, Civil Rights During the 1990s: New
Treaty Law Could Help Immensely, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 423, 461 (1997).
73. See Art. 9 Reports, Addendum, supra note 31, ¶ 173; Sum. Record 1402d
Mtng., supra note 31, ¶¶ 22, 27; Sum. Record 1401st Mtng., supra note 31, ¶ 46.
See generally Sum. Record 1474th Mtng., supra note 72.
74. See Sum. Record 1474th Mtng., supra note 72, ¶ 63; Sum. Record 1402d
Mtng., supra note 31, ¶ 22; Sum. Record 1401st Mtng., supra note 31, ¶ 35.
75. Sum. Record 1401st Mtng., supra note 31, ¶ 38.
76. See Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture, 23d sess, Nov. 8–19, 1999, 24th
sess, May 1–19, 2000, ¶ 180, U.N. Doc. A/55/44; GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 44
(2000); Consideration of Art. 19 Reports, supra note 72, ¶ 40; Sum. Record 703d
Mtng., supra note 72, ¶ 72; Consideration of Art. 9 Reports, supra note 31, ¶¶ 11,
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in response to a CAT report submitted by the United States, the
Committee Against Torture relayed to the United States that ―[t]he
Committee reiterates its recommendation that the [United States]
should consider withdrawing its reservations, declarations and understandings lodged at the time of ratification of the Convention.‖77
If the United States holds that the rights recognized under the covenants are already guaranteed in domestic law, then why are the domestic courts being deprived of the opportunity to rely on the conventions as the true law of the land?78 Would it not be preferable to
make ratified human rights treaties self-executing so that the people
protected by such treaties could actually enforce their treaty rights in
their own domestic court system?79 In 2000, the Chairperson of the
Committee Against Torture, Peter Thomas Burns, believed so.80 At
the 424th meeting in which the Committee Against Torture considered the initial report of the United States regarding the CAT, Mr.
Burns stated: ―Articles 1 to 16 were non-self-executing and yet, according to the report, their provisions indirectly formed part of United States law. Under those circumstances, would it not be preferable
to make them self-executing so that individuals could invoke them in
legal proceedings?‖81 Since the conventions were intended to benefit individuals, exactly how are individuals being protected if the
convention rights cannot be domestically enforced where domestic
law may fall short of treaty obligations?82 As Omran El Shafei, an
Egyptian national and a member of the Human Rights Committee,
noted in 1995 at the 1401st meeting in which the Human Rights
Committee considered the initial report of the United States in regard
to the CCPR:
18; Sum. Record 1402d Mtng., supra note 31, ¶ 22; see also Issues Considered on
U.S. 2d Report, supra note 72, ¶ 5; Sum. Record 1474th Mtng., supra note 72,
¶ 30; Sum. Record 1401st Mtng., supra note 31, ¶ 48.
77. Consideration of Art. 19 Reports, supra note 72, ¶ 40.
78. See Sum. Record 1401st Mtng., supra note 31, ¶ 34.
79. See Comm. Against Torture, Summary Record of the First Part (Public)* of
the 424th Meeting, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.424 (May 10, 2000).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Issues Considered on U.S. 2d Report, supra note 72, ¶ 5; Sum. Record
1475th Mtng., supra note 65, ¶ 4; Sum. Record 1405th Mtng., supra note 31, ¶ 7;
Sum. Record 1401st Mtng., supra note 31, ¶ 34.

56

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 9, No. 1

[T]he purpose of treaties [is] for States to undertake new obligations, and in the case of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, to conform domestic law to international standards enshrined in the Covenant. It [is] regrettable that by its decision, the [United States] Government [has]
prevented the Covenant from being tested in the United
States courts.83
IV. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Probably the best-known vehicle in the United States used to enforce civil rights, and to civilly prosecute civil rights violations, is 42
U.S.C § 1983.84 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not, itself, provide any substantive rights.85 Rather, § 1983 is a legal vehicle which is used to
bring violations of federal law to court.86 Accordingly, if one‘s civil
rights are violated, a vehicle used to bring that claim before a court
would be § 1983. Therefore, it would stand to reason if one‘s human
rights were violated that § 1983 would also be an available vehicle to
bring such a claim before a domestic court within the United

83. Sum. Record 1401st Mtng., supra note 31, ¶ 46.
84. Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer‘s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (emphasis added).
85. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n.3 (1979). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 merely
provides the method and judicial jurisdiction for enforcement of rights conferred
elsewhere in the law. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284–85 (2002); Baker, 443 U.S. at 145 n.3.
86. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284–85; Baker, 443 U.S. at 145 n.3.
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States.87 This is particularly true if one traces the history of the statute.
When originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 ―provided a cause of action only for deprivation of
rights ‗secured by the Constitution.‘‖88 Therefore, as originally contemplated, § 1983 was not a vehicle for treaty violations.89 However, Congress expanded the rights protected when it added the phrase
―and laws‖ to the end of the phrase, ―secured by the Constitution.‖90
But, does ―and laws‖ also mean treaties? The U.S. Supreme Court
has held that ―and laws‖ does not just mean subsets of federal statutes; it means just that—laws.91 However, for the purposes of
§ 1983, are treaties ―laws‖? The U.S. Supreme Court has also held
that ―laws‖ specifically include ―a congressionally sanctioned . . .
compact.‖92 Predicated on these analogous holdings, and without
challenges to the applicability of § 1983 being raised, treaty rights
have been previously asserted through the use of § 1983.93 While
not a U.S. Supreme Court case, perhaps the clearest case on this issue is the Seventh Circuit case, Jogi v. Voges.94 While specifically
dealing with rights conferred by the Vienna Convention on Consular
87. See generally Martin A. Geer, Human Rights and Wrongs in Our Own Backyard: Incorporating International Human Rights Protections Under Domestic
Civil Rights Law—A Case Study of Women in United States Prisons, 13 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 71, 119–24 (2000); de la Vega, supra note 72, at 450–51; Carlos
Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 1082, 1141–57 (1992).
88. John T. Parry, A Primer on Treaties and § 1983 After Medellín v. Texas, 13
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 35, 38 (2009); see Civil Rights Act, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat.
13 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)).
89. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
90. Civil Rights Act, ch. 24 § 1979, 93 Stat. 1284 (1979) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 1983) (providing a cause of action for rights ―secured by the Constitution
and laws‖); see Parry, supra note 88, at 38.
91. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980); Parry, supra note 88, at 38–39.
92. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 442 (1981); Parry, supra note 88, at 39.
93. See, e.g., Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1272, 1274–75
(E.D. Va. 1996), aff’d, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 663 F. Supp. 682, 684–86 (W.D.
Wis. 1987), app. dismissed, 829 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1987); Parry, supra note 88, at
45; cf. United States v. Washington, 813 F.2d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 1987).
94. 480 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2007).
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Relations, the Jogi decision ―clearly and explicitly‖95 sets forth that
an individual asserting self-executing treaty rights ―is entitled to pursue his [or her] claim under § 1983.‖96 In support of this holding,
the court in Jogi noted that § 1983 ―was designed to be a remedy
‗against all forms of official violation of federally protected
rights.‘‖97 Currently, the Jogi opinion stands by itself as the only
decision that so clearly and squarely addresses the issue of general
treaty rights being litigated through the use of § 1983.98 But, more
importantly, to date, no other court has clearly ruled contrary to the
Jogi decision on the issue of treaty rights being appropriately asserted through the use of § 1983.99
Since § 1983 could be used to assert treaty violations, such as violations of international human rights treaties, and is widely used to
assert civil rights violations, exactly what is the difference between a
non-self-executing ―human right‖ and a domestically enforceable
―civil right‖? Black‘s Law Dictionary defines ―civil right‖ as follows:
The individual rights of personal liberty guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights and by the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 19th Amendments, as well as by legislation such as the Voting Rights
Act. Civil rights include esp[ecially] the right to vote, the
right of due process, and the right of equal protection under
the law.100
Black‘s Law Dictionary defines ―civil liberty‖ as follows:
Freedom from undue governmental interference or restraint.
This term usu[ally] refers to freedom of speech or religion.
In American law, early civil liberties were promulgated in the
Lawes and Libertyes of Massachusetts (1648) and the Bill of
Rights (1791). In English law, examples are found in [the]

95. Parry, supra note 88, at 51.
96. Jogi, 480 F.3d at 835–36.
97. Id. at 827 (quoting Monell v. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658,
700–01 (1978)) (emphasis added); see Parry, supra note 88, at 50.
98. Parry, supra note 88, at 51.
99. Id.
100. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 263 (8th ed. 2004).
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Magna Carta (1215), the Petition of Right (1628), and the
Bill of Rights (1689).101
So far, civil rights, as litigated in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases, sound
a lot like the international human rights set forth in the CCPR, CAT,
and CERD. Black‘s Law Dictionary defines ―human rights‖ as:
―The freedoms, immunities, and benefits that, according to modern
values (esp[ecially] at an international level), all human beings
should be able to claim as a matter of right in the society in which
they live.‖102 By pure definition, it may appear that human rights are
broader than civil rights; however, the CCPR, CAT, and CERD specifically and intentionally narrow the scope of rights from a broad
definition of human rights, down to a very workable formula of specific rights, that are very analogous to domestic civil rights in the
United States. Therefore, it would stand to reason that the CCPR,
CAT, and CERD should be applicable to § 1983 cases. One could
logically conclude that by ratifying the CCPR, CAT, and CERD, the
United States would want to provide its own citizens with the rights
and remedies that it projected as offering to the rest of the world as
an international community. However, such is not the case.
V. NON-SELF-EXECUTING DECLARATIONS: THERE IS MORE TO IT
While the previous sections identified particular non-selfexecuting declarations of the United States, this section provides an
explanation and analysis of what a non-self-executing declaration is
and how it operates. The placement and order of this particular section of this article is due to the fact that it is important to first set
forth the declarations of the United States before providing a legal
analysis of those declarations. However, the United States is very
clear in its intent to preclude the assertion of treaty rights in national
courts that the definition, analysis, and effect of a non-self-executing
declaration becomes patently obvious before the legal analysis can
be set forth. By now, any reader could probably guess, based solely
on the previous assertions of the United States, that ―non-self101. Id.
102. Id. at 758.
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executing‖ means that one cannot go down to his or her local courthouse in Anytown, USA and file a lawsuit. However, the analysis is
a bit more complex than just that simple, yet accurate, description.
How do the international human rights treaties at issue interact with
the domestic civil rights law of the United States, and, particularly,
42 U.S.C. § 1983? How should international human rights treaties
interact with the domestic civil rights law of the United States?
In the seminal case of The Paquete Habana,103 Justice Gray, in
his deliverance of the opinion for the U.S. Supreme Court, set forth:
―International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for
their determination.‖104 Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution of
the United States, in part, reads: ―The judicial Power shall extend to
all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority.‖105 The Supremacy Clause, contained
within Article VI of the Constitution of the United States, reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.106
Therefore, it would appear, at least initially, that international human
rights treaties would be treated by all courts within the United States
as the ―the supreme Law of the Land.‖107 However, a review of
judicial interpretation reveals that the apparently clear words of the
Constitution of the United States are not so clear.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

175 U.S. 677 (1900).
Id. at 700.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. art. VI (emphasis added).
See id.
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While the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of the United
States references ―Treaties,‖108 the U.S. Supreme Court makes a distinction between treaties that are the judicial equivalent of legislative
acts and treaties that are merely contracts of politics between nations
and concludes that the latter is not a justiciable issue for the courts
until and unless the legislature enacts positive domestic legislation
thereon.109 In Foster v. Neilson, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth:
In the United States a different principle is established. Our
constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is
consequently to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent
to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself
without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the
terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the
parties engage to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and
the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.110
Accordingly, for the purpose of whether a treaty is justiciable,
treaties have been assigned judicially to one of two categories: (1)
self-executing, or (2) non-self-executing.111 ―[W]hile treaties ‗may
comprise international commitments . . . they are not domestic law
unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be ‗self-executing‘ and is ratified
on these terms.‘‖112 To provide further clarity on the issue, the U.S.
Supreme Court has set forth precisely what it means:
The label ―self-executing‖ has on occasion been used to convey different meanings. What we mean by ―self-executing‖
is that the treaty has automatic domestic effect as federal law
upon ratification. Conversely, a ―non-self-executing‖ treaty
does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable feder108. Id.
109. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 254 (1829), overruled in part by United
States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833).
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–05 (2008).
112. Id. at 505 (quoting Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150
(1st Cir. 2005) (en banc)).
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al law. Whether such a treaty has domestic effect depends
upon implementing legislation passed by Congress.113
However, ―[e]ven when treaties are self-executing in the sense
that they create federal law, the background presumption is that
‗[i]nternational agreements, even those directly benefiting private
persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts.‘‖114 Based on this legal presumption, several federal appellate courts have noted that, absent
express treaty language to the contrary, international treaties do not
create privately enforceable rights and, therefore, do not create justiciable issues for individuals to litigate in domestic courts.115
VI. RATIFIED TREATIES NOW! RESCISSION OF RUDS LATER?
While treaties may be binding international law, the bottom line
is that the non-self-executing declarations made by the United States
in regard to the CCPR, CAT, and CERD make these human rights
treaties nothing more than unenforceable ideals in the national
113. Id. at 505 n.2.
114. Id. at 506 n.3 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 907 cmt. a (1987)).
115. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 389 (6th Cir.
2001); United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 195, 198 (5th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60–61 (1st Cir. 2000) (en banc); Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir. 1992); Canadian Transp.
Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Mannington Mills,
Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1298 (3d Cir. 1979). See generally Anna Maria Gabrielidis, Human Rights Begin at Home: A Policy Analysis of Litigating International Human Rights in U.S. State Courts, 12 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
139 (2006); Aya Gruber, Sending the Self-Execution Doctrine to the Executioner,
3 FLA. INT‘L U. L. REV. 57 (2007); David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties:
Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2002); David Sloss,
Ex Parte Young and Federal Remedies for Human Rights Treaty Violations, 75
WASH. L. REV. 1103 (2000) [hereinafter Sloss, Ex Parte Young]; David Sloss, The
Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations
and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT‘L L. 129 (1999) [hereinafter Sloss,
Domestication of Int‘l Human Rights]; Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law
of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122
HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1999) [hereinafter Vázquez, Laughing at Treaties].

2010

42 U.S.C. § 1983

63

courts.116 But why? Why would the United States do this? There
are two possible theories: The ―safety valve‖ theory and the ―window dressing‖ theory.117 The ―safety valve‖ theory is simply that the
domestic law of the United States is not a complete redundancy of
treaty rights and that, therefore, the non-self-executing declarations
are a ―safety valve‖ to preclude the judiciary from domestically enforcing any treaty rights that are not codified in existing national
law.118 The United States takes the position that its domestic laws
envelop its international human rights obligations.119 But just in
case there is a new treaty right that is not a redundancy of national
law, a non-self-executing declaration would act as a ―safety valve‖
to prevent any separate and unique treaty-based right from being
asserted in a national court.120
The ―window dressing‖ theory is that the United States made its
domestic law understandings and non-self-executing declarations as
a form of ―window dressing‖ that, in theory, enabled the United
States to fully comply with its treaty obligations while, at the same
time, not disturbing pre-existing national law.121 This ―window
dressing‖ was then used as an enticement in order to secure the Senate votes necessary to ratify the treaties in the first place.122 If the
national law already fully complies with treaty obligations, then
there is certainly more incentive for the Senate to vote in favor of
ratification over a situation where ratification would require comprehensive changes to domestic law. If the ―window dressing‖ theory
116. See, e.g., Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 370–76 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that
non-self-executing treaties are not binding on the courts); White v. Paulsen, 997 F.
Supp. 1380, 1386–87 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (holding that no private cause of action
can be brought under the CCPR or CAT); see Gabrielidis, supra note 115, at 156;
Sloss, Ex Parte Young, supra note 115, at 1120–23; Vázquez, Laughing at Treaties, supra note 115, at 2175–88.
117. See Sloss, Domestication of Int‘l Human Rights, supra note 115, at 189.
118. Id.
119. See Consideration of Art. 19 Reports, Addendum, supra note 31, ¶ 60; Consideration of Art. 9 Reports, supra note 31, ¶¶ 11, 18; Art. 9 Reports, Addendum,
supra note 31, ¶¶ 169–73; Sum. Record 1402d Mtng., supra note 31, ¶¶ 3, 25;
Sum. Record 1401st Mtng., supra note 31, ¶ 34; Consideration of Art. 40 Reports,
Addendum, supra note 31, ¶ 8.
120. See Sloss, Domestication of Int‘l Human Rights, supra note 115, at 189.
121. Id. at 190.
122. Id.
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were correct, and accommodations were made in order to obtain ratification as part of a better-than-nothing plan, then the next logical
step would be to work on rescinding the original reservations, understandings, and declarations. If compromises were necessary to gain
ratification, then it is about time to take the next step. The treaties
are ratified. But where is the next move to rescind even a single line
of the original reservations, understandings, and declarations? These
rhetorical questions support a subscription to the ―safety valve‖
theory. However, maybe it is all a matter of timing. Maybe the
―window dressing‖ theory is correct, but the right time to rescind the
reservations, understandings, and declarations has simply not yet
arrived.
An argument could be made that, under either theory, the United
States has violated general principles of international law by not ratifying the treaties in good faith. It is, arguably, less than good faith to
enter into a treaty that may grant new and unique rights while also
inserting a ―safety valve‖ in order to ensure that any treaty rights are
not judicially enforceable. The counterargument for justification of
a ―safety valve‖ is that it is perfectly permissible under international
law to declare a treaty to be non-self-executing unless the treaty itself prohibits it. It is also, arguably, less than good faith to enter into
a treaty that may require some modification of existing national law
by hanging a negating ―window dressing‖ in order to garner the ratification votes of lawmakers. While not really fitting into either
theory, perhaps a beneficial result, intended or not, is that if an already-existing domestic law mirrors an international treaty obligation, then the legislative branch may just be reluctant to rescind any
domestic law that has already been asserted as the domestic satisfaction of an international obligation. Therefore, at a minimum, an argument can certainly be made that the international human rights
treaties ratified by the United States may at least, in part, preserve
and maintain already existing domestic civil rights law.
No matter the reason why, the fact remains that the CCPR, CAT,
and CERD have been ratified by the United States.123 The first step
has been accomplished. However, by declaring the CCPR, CAT,
and CERD treaties to be non-self-executing, the United States de123. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.
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prives its own citizens of a form of justice by extinguishing additional sources of substantive rights that otherwise could be enforced
through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For this reason, § 1983 is truly a legal
vehicle that is not being permitted to take on any international human rights treaty passengers.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The United States, in ratifying the CCPR, CAT, and CERD by
conditioning the human rights elicited to the confines of existing
domestic law, deprives the international community of its commitment to the full scope of the rights the treaties were truly intended to
provide and protect. Moreover, by not making the treaty obligations
self-executing, the United States also denies its own citizens of any
new domestically enforceable human rights and deprives its own
citizens of a form of justice by squelching additional sources of
substantive rights that otherwise could be enforced by the use of 42
U.S.C. § 1983. For these reasons, the United States should take the
next step for the promotion of human rights and rescind these reservations, understandings, and declarations. By doing so, the United
States would honor its international human rights obligations on a
more even level with the rest of the international participants, while
also providing its own citizens, through the use of § 1983, with new
sources of enforceable substantive rights.
The reasoning of the United States appears to be circular in that
it attempts to limit its international obligations by the scope of its
national law while, at the same time, limiting its national law by
making its international human rights obligations unenforceable in
domestic courts. Arguably, this circular reasoning could be considered as the United States acting with less than complete good faith.
However, the fact that the United States has ratified the CCPR, CAT,
and CERD at all is still a very positive first step. Ratification now
requires the United States to report to the United Nations, and subjects the United States to corrective criticism from the international
community. While the author of this article is somewhat skeptical
that the United States will ever actually withdraw its reservations,
understandings, and declarations, the fact remains that the United
States is required to continue in its reporting and will continue to be
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critiqued by the rest of the world. Maybe, just maybe, the United
States may actually implement a change for the better based upon
the power of international suggestion. At least the seed has been
planted. Maybe, one day, the choking weeds, in the form of reservations, understandings, and declarations, will be removed; thus, allowing a mighty tree of universally applied civil and human rights to
grow.

